Investment climate : an institutional approach
The transit ion process in Russia has been far more arduous than what was expected in 1992. One of the main lessons of these difficult ies is that it is extremely difficult for reformers to impose measures from above, without taking into account the exist ing inst itut ional framework (legal texts, written and tacit norms, habits, expectat ions, etc.). As far as Russia is concerned, policies would have probably experienced more positive results, had they been adapted to local contexts.
As the World bank defines it, investment climate is "the set of locat ion specific factors shaping the opportunities and incent ives for firms to invest product ively, create jobs, and expand" (World Bank, 2005, p. 20) . The exist ing literature acknowledges that investment climate is shaped by inst itut ional and political factors (Henisz, 2000 , Hallberg, 2005 , Majocchi and Strange, 2007 , Von Luebke, 2007 , Slangen and Beugelsdijk, 2010 . In World Bank publicat ions, a "good investment climate" is usually described as being the result of the well funct ioning of three pillars: macroeconomic stability and openness to trade; good governance and inst itut ions, including control of bureaucrat ic harassment and crime, as well as effect ive financial and legal inst itut ions; and adequate infrastructures (Stern, 2003 , World Bank, 2005 . More precisely, the former chief economist of the World Bank, includes in the investment climate "policy, inst itut ional, and behavioural environment, both present and expected, that influences the returns, and risks, associated with investment" (Stern, 2001) . In accordance with this definition, in our analysis of the Russian investment climate we take into account the expectat ions and appreciat ions of economic agents regarding their inst itut ional environment. Hence our acceptat ion of the investment climate as a set of inst itut ions, policies and enforcement mechanisms that are considered as relevant by companies in their investment decisions.
Economic transition in Russia has been characterized as a market oriented inst itut ional change (Economic Commission for Europe, 1992 , Kozul-Wright and Rayment, 1997 , Internat ional Monetary Fund, 2000 , World Bank, 2002 . Kim et alii (2010) see market oriented inst itut ional change as a two stages process : in the first stage, inconsistencies and frict ions among formal inst itut ions and between formal and informal inst itut ions produce uncertainty in the economic environment. This uncertainty is detrimental to the investment climate. In the second stage, these frict ions are supposed to vanish progressively as market oriented inst itut ions prevail over inherited inst itut ions (Kim et alii, 2010 (Kim et alii, , p. 1143 . In order to assess the current transformat ions of the investment climate in Russia, we propose a conceptual framework able to grasp not only the official policy steps taken by the Russian authorit ies, but also the "inst itut ional frict ions" (the "inst itut ional hiatus" as Kozul-Wright and Rayment (1997) put it) prevailing in the business environment. This conceptual framework is based on an inst itut ional approach of economic and inst itut ional changes.
Inst itut ional evolut ion is a process involving various stages, interconnected with one another.
Firstly (at the « theory stage »), policy makers adopt theories about the economic situat ion their are facing and the policy tools they have to use in order to improve it. Secondly (at the « legal stage »), legal texts (laws, decrees and so on) are adopted on the basis of these theories with the aim to impulse behaviour changes in the right direct ion. Thirdly (at the « enforcement stage »), at the microeconomic level, this legal framework is enacted by administrat ive bodies and interpreted by economic agents as a new basis for their ant icipat ions and behaviours. Fourthly (at the «evaluat ion stage »), the stat ist ical and scient ific inquiry apparatus provides various measurements of the results of the whole process. These measurements are images of the reality that allow new theories to be elaborated by analysts and adopted, in turn, by policy makers.
[ Figure 1 to be inserted here]
Of course, such a cycle cannot be a simple one : there are mult iple possibilities of reverse causat ion between each dimension of the process. Moreover, each dimension can be directly connected to the three others. For example, the stat ist ical image of the results (the « evaluat ion stage ») is largely influenced by the theories in use, since the latter contributes to define the
From theories to laws : the formal context of investment in Russia
In 2008, Russian government launched the «Russian 2020 growth strategy », whose main object ive was to shift toward an innovat ion-driven growth and to reduce the dependence of the economy on the product ion of raw materials. This announcement followed seven years of unprecedented growth, during which GDP more than doubled while Foreign Direct Investments (FDI) inflows surged, promoting Russia as one of the top five destinat ions for investments in the world. During this period, however, Russian economic growth was largely driven by extract ive and raw materials industries, attract ing large inflows of capital and leaving little room for hightech investments and innovat ive act ivities (World Bank, 2008 , OECD, 2009 , Vercueil, 2010 .
For this reason, Russian authorities repeatedly emphasized the necessity to set up favourable legal condit ions for the diversificat ion of the economy. Attract ing foreign capital and technologies being widely seen as a way to improve the level of product ivity and innovat ion of domest ic enterprises (Borenzstein, De Gregorio, and Lee, 1998, Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004) , the friendliness of the business environment for foreign investors has become one of the declared priorit ies of the Government. In next subsect ions, we explore several domains in which the legal environment of the Russian economy has been changed in the past few years. " We need the support of the U.S. plus our own consistency in words and actions in order to join the WTO individually." Alexei Portansky (Moscow High School of Economics), April 2010.
World Trade Organization accession
Since WTO promotes an internat ionally harmonized legal framework for nat ional and foreign enterprises, WTO membership is generally associated with a better investment climate. Hence, one could expect that, in order to improve the investment climate in their country, Russian execut ives try to accelerate its membership. However, the long last ing accession negotiations to the WTO have repeatedly shown the reluctance of Russian authorit ies to fully comply with the 7 legal framework of the internat ional organizat ion (Vercueil, 2002 (Vercueil, , 2007 . Having started in 1993, the process is st ill not completed, 17 years later. Russian is now the largest economy and the only G20 member st ill outside the WTO.
Meanwhile, the GATT has been transformed in WTO, average tariffs have been lowered all over the world and some rules have become more stringent on the possibility for an economy to protect what it considers to be its economic interests. The organizat ion has also welcomed new countries, among which Georgia and Ukraine, that are now part of the negot iations for accession of Russian and might complicate it. The Working Party 2 on Russia's accession to WTO counts now 60 members and has become the largest negotiat ion group ever constituted in the organizat ion's history. At the current stage, however, Russian has agreed bilateral market access agreements with all the members of its Working Party (possibly except Georgia). The remaining difficult ies lie in three sectors :
Agricultural subsidies. Russia wants to be allowed to spend $9 billions per year in order to support its product ion.
Export taxes on timber. Discussions resumed recently with the EU.
3. State trading organizations 3 . These public organizat ions are seen are market distort ions by certain members of the working party.
Russian authorities' att itude about WTO accession has been changing for the last two years. After a period of negotiat ions within the Working Party, Prime Minister Vladimir Put in declared on June 10, 2009 that Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan would abandon their separate accession talks in order to enter WTO as a customs union. This statement came as a surprise for at least two reasons : first, it disregarded WTO rules. The organizat ion considers only territories will full sovereignty over their trade policy as potent ial members 4 . Second, Russia has far more advanced 2 That is, the group of nation members that are involved in the accession negotiations of a given country.
3
World Bank, Russian Economic Report, n°19, June 2009 4 The Marrakesh agreement stipulates that unified customs territories applying for membership must have full sovereignty over their trade policies, as do Hong-Kong and Taiwan, and does not mention customs unions of any kind. its accession talks than its two partners. Such a tact ical change could slow down considerably its progress towards accession.
This unexpected announcement was later tempered by other declarat ions of Russian top officials, saying that Russia would join the WTO in whichever way that would be effect ive. In April 2010, Russian First Deputy Prime Minister Igor Shuvalov acknowledged that Russia could abandon its plans to join the World Trade Organizat ion in a joint bid with Kazakhstan and Belarus, adding that Russia hopes to complete all procedures by the end of the year 5 .
Box 1. Russia's Membership of international and regional structures
Political and security structures : Sources : PriceWaterhouseCooper, 2009 . Transparency International, 2009a Apart from WTO and OECD, Russia is now a member of all relevant internat ional economic organizat ions and has signed many internat ional agreements (see the list in Box 1), attesting its will to be considered as a full-fledged member of the internat ional economic community.
Regulations on foreign investments
"We will only welcome foreign investments, especially those bringing in new technologies.
We don't have any other way"
Alexei Kudrin, Finance Minister of the Russian Federation, February 2010.
Ensuring a level playing field between domest ic and foreign firms is one of the conditions for attract ing foreign investors. In this respect, Russia's legal environment is often considered as unsat isfactory by foreign observers (OCDE, 2009) . The current state of its legal framework is summarized in Box 2.
Box 2. Russian Legislation Regarding Foreign Direct Investments
Code of Liberalization of capital movements : Source : Levashenko, 2010. One of the limits of the exist ing legal system is lack of consistency : while the Federal Law 'On foreign Investments in the Russian Federat ion' states that the legal regime of the act ivity of foreign investors may not be less favourable than the legal regime of act ivity, it opens the possibility of introducing limitat ions to this provision by referring to other, more restrict ive normat ive-legal acts. For example, in the banking sector, foreign credit inst itut ions must submit addit ional documents in order to register as a Russian legal ent ity, in violat ion of the principle of extending the nat ional legal regime to foreign investors.
More recently, the « Law on Strategic Industries » of 29 April 2008 6 prevents foreign states, internat ional organizat ions and organizat ions controlled thereby, from the right to take control over 42 types of act ivit ies 7 (Levashenko, 2010) . Replacing the former case-by-case, opaque system of authorisat ions, this law has been considered by western analysts as a welcome step toward a clearer legal environment for FDI. However, the sectoral coverage of the law is much broader than in OECD countries, that limit the scope of « strategic industries » to nat ional defence, public order and health (Conway et alii, 2009) . Gavan port in the Khabarovsk Territory. The SEZ in Kaliningrad, previously established in 1996, has been able to attract some moderate investments, but those in the Russian Far East had less success. The special tourist economic zone in Krasnodar, site of the 2014 Sotchi Winter Olympics, was expected to attract significant foreign investment, but the financial crisis and the polit ical uncertainty prevailing in the Caucasus region might postpone many investment projects. In addition to weapons, aviation and space, the law also names natural monopolies (except electrical power, municipal heating and postal services), the mass media and companies involved in natural resource exploration and extraction (except where the Russian government owns more than 50% of the company) as strategic. According to the law, foreign investors acquiring control over Russian strategic enterprises are required to obtain approval of a special government commission. The Federal Antimonopoly Service and Federal Security Service must establish that the acquisition does not threaten Russia's national security.
Protecting intellectual property rights
12 discoveries, and new technologies. Public and private companies will receive full support in all endeavours that create a demand for innovative products. Foreign companies and research organisations will be offered the most favourable conditions for establishing research and design centres in Russia. We will hire the best scientists and engineers from around the world. Most importantly, we will explain to our young people that the most important competitive advantage is knowledge that others do not have, intellectual superiority, the ability to create things that people need. » Dmitry Medvedev, President of the Russian Federation, September 2009. Doted with fairly good technological capacities (notably in informat ion technologies) and loose legal environment, Russia has been considered by western investors as a kind of heaven for piracy. Meanwhile, as part of its WTO accession talks, the country has signed all major internat ional agreements concerning Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) (See Box 3). Russian policy makers have often stressed the importance of alleviat ing the administrat ive burden on domest ic enterprises in all sectors. The corporate tax rate was cut from 24 percent to 20 percent. As regard public procurement, the Government intends to use more broadly internet
Box 3. Participation of the Russian Federation to international agreements and conventions on intellectual property

Clarifying the legal and administrative environment of specific sectors
applicat ions for open contests and auct ions and to streamline rules for state and municipal contracts for supplies, works and services 9 . For instance, the new Town Planning Code was adopted in late 2004, with the aim to introduce more transparent regulat ions on the issuance of construct ions permits. A further step was made after 1 January 2007 : a single state examinat ion of construct ion permits replaced the former, mult i-level and opaque system. In 2009, property registrat ion was accelerated by simplifying documentat ion requirements. As regards bankruptcy 8 RIA Novosti, 30/01/2009 . For instance, the Russian law on topology of integrated microcircuits protects computer programs and semiconductor topologies during 10 years after the date of registration. Being the world's fourth largest producer of electricity, Russia needs to modernize its electricity system in order to meet the growing demand for electric power. Unt il 2007, electricity generat ion was dominated by State-owned Unified Energy Systems (RAO UES), who owned power plants, vert ically integrated energy companies, the federal high voltage transmission grid and the energy dispatching system. Almost all its output was sold to the domest ic market. In 2008 the unbundling of RAO UES was terminated, result ing in the creat ion of six wholesale generat ion companies (WGCs) and 14 territorial generat ion companies (TGCs). This restructuring and sales of assets have provided several buying opportunities for foreign investors (UNCTAD, 2009a) .
The OECD carried out a synthet ic assessment of the legal framework surrounding business act ivit ies in Russia, called « Price Market Restrict ion Index » (PMR). Based on hard data, this index covers a wide range of legal act ivities that influence the ability of private businesses to conduct their operat ions. Ult imately, this index provides a measure of the degree of restrict ion to compet it ion prevailing in a given country. Table 1 shows the results of a comparison conducted between Russia and the OECD average countries on the basis of these criteria.
[ Table 1 to be inserted here]
In all the dimensions covered, the index is far higher in Russia than in the average OCDE countries. According to this assessment, the sector in which the state pressure is the t ightest are linked to internat ional trade and monopolist ic sectors. To say the least, the prevailing assessment of the Russian situat ion regarding corrupt ion is not favourable 10 . After a relative improvement following the succession of Boris Yeltsin, the problem seemed to increase anew during the second part of the economic growth period, causing some alarms in western commentaries. In 2008 however, a real change seemed to be possible after the Imposing that all public officials, civil servants, the police and judges submit asset declarations, in order to reduce the opportunities for them to take or extort bribes.
Fighting corruption
10
In 2002 and in 2005, Russia featured one of the worst corruption indicators of the 33 transition countries surveyed by the « anti-corrupt ion survey » of the World Bank. Journal of Euromarketing, Vol.19, N°2-3, 2010 16
Establishing that when a bribe is offered, or commercial bribery takes place, the legal entity, not just the individuals involved, will be held liable.
Establishing new warnings and administrative fines for legal entities. This requirement will be developed through an amendment to the Code of the Russian Federation on administrative offences. : Transparency Internat ional, 2009. Western analysts consider that these changes constitute a real improvement in the ant icorrupt ion legal framework, as they set up a basis for effect ively counteract ing corrupt ion in Russia (Transparency Internat ional, 2009).
Source
Supporting Small and Medium Entreprises (SME)
« We should pay more attention to the structure of small and medium-sized businesses and extend support to high-tech enterprises ». « We will ban any unjustifiable interference in entrepreneurship » Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister of the Russian Federation, January and March 2010.
One peculiarity of the Russian economy is the relat ive weakness of its SME network. The est imated share of GDP produced by SMEs is around 13-17 %, while their part in total employment is only about a fifth, far below the respect ive figures in OECD countries. Part of this weakness seems to be due to the difficult ies experienced by SMEs in the face of regulatory uncertainty (OECD, 2008 , Molz et alii, 2010 . The Government programme on long-term socioeconomic development of the Russian Federation intends to increase the proport ion of GDP produced by SMEs to 30 % by 2020.
A new « Law on SME development » had been adopted in 2007, but without being followed by the addit ional legislative acts that were necessary to put in concrete form its provisions. Shortly after his inaugurat ion in May 2008, President Medvedev signed a decree on urgent measures to eliminate administrat ive barriers to entrepreneurship. This decision accelerated the adopt ion of other legislat ive acts (See Box 5).
Box 5. New measures concerning SMEs in Russia
Pre-empt ive rights to purchase state property leased for at least three years (July
2008)
Limits to scheduled inspections of SMEs to one every three years : any unscheduled inspection now requires an authorisation of the Prosecutor General (May 2009) Introduction of a notification mechanism for 13 types of business activities including retail trade, hotel and restaurants and publishing (May 2009) Reduced tariffs for access to electrical grids Extension of the obligatory state contract quota of 10-20 % reserved for small businesses to purchases by municipalities.
Anti-crisis measures :
Increase in budget expenditures to 10.5 billion roubles in 2009 directed at SME support, such as grants to new entrepreneurs, development of microfinancing and interest rate subsidies.
Injection of 30 billion roubles into the capital of Vneshekonombank, targeted on commercial banks and non-bank financial entities working with SMEs.
Source : Conway and alii, 2009. Addit ional measures could be adopted in the near future, among which the shortening of the list of products requiring cert ificat ion, introducing special support for innovative SMEs, ensuring a non-discriminatory access to gas infrastructure, etc.
From laws to perceptions : the enforcement problem « The severity of Russian laws is balanced by the fact that their enforcement is optional » Mikhail Saltykov-Shchedrin
Despite the aforement ioned stock of legal texts whose purpose is to improve the investment climate in Russia, the picture taken from western comments about the country's business environment is mit igated. For instance, the U.S. State Department considers that « investors [in Russian] face several significant challenges, including a complex regulatory and legal system that requires professional help to navigate, widespread corrupt ion, a lack of respect for the rule of law, and immature banking and financial markets […] Concerns about possible liabilities associated with exist ing operat ions (especially environmental cleanup) and inadequate bankruptcy procedures are also factors. » 11 This assessment is confirmed by firms-level studies. Drawing their conclusions from a series of semi-structured interviews with small and medium-sized enterprises managers, Rick Molz, Ian Tabbaa and Natalia Totskaya conclude that "in Russia the inst itut ional environment remains weak, unstable and unpredictable, creat ing challenges for SMEs to contributes significantly to growth and development of the Russian economy" (Molz et alii, 2009 ). Their conclusion can be confronted to other percept ions of the features that contribute to shape the investment climate in Russian : corrupt ion, compet it ion, and the role of judicial system.
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US State Department website (www.state.gov), 2010
Corruption assessments, corruption perceptions «Russian citizen have a primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption »
Dmitry Medvedev, September 2009. Anderson and Gray (2006) remarked that despite apparent efforts of the Government to strengthen the ant i-corrupt ion legislation, enterprises cont inued to regard Russia as a country were corrupt ion is prevailing. The authors conclude that « the results for Russia underscore the fact that policy reforms may be necessary but are not always sufficient to reduce corrupt ion in and of themselves. Fundamental inst itut ional strengthening to ensure policy implementat ion, build checks and balances, and promote accountability in government is also essent ial » (Anderson and Gray, 2006) . servants (index 4,5), followed by political part ies, the Parliament, and Justice (3,9 each), private sector (3,7) and mass media (3,5). There is a general consensus about the endemic corrupt ion among civil servants : 63 % of people surveyed think that they are the most corrupted sector (Transparency Internat ional, 2009b) . Such a polarizat ion of the public opinion on a specific sector is one of the highest in the world. Respondents to another survey were scept ical about the capacity of the Russian authorities to fight corrupt ion : 56 per cent of business people and 58 per cent of cit izens stated that it was 'hardly possible' (Transparency Internat ional, 2009a). More generally, in the Newly Independent States (among which Russia), the level of the perceived « State Capture » by private interests (that is, the ability of a private enterprise to obtain, by illegal means, favourable legal condit ions from public officials) is the highest in the world : 71 % of respondents think that enterprises use corrupt ion in order to influence polit ics, laws or governmental rules (Transparency Internat ional, 2009b).
Are Russian markets distorted ? The business point of view "Modernization begins with oneself"
Igor Shuvalov, February 2010 In 2007, 53% of the total number of violat ions of ant itrust law in 2007 was committed by various levels of the Russian Government, 80% of which being committed by the regional and municipal authorit ies (Conway et alii, 2009 ). Since then, simplificat ions in administrat ive procedures and the Government's efforts to struggle against arbitrary administrat ive decisions could have diminished the extent of administrat ive burden on private enterprises. Nonetheless, problems in the tax environment remain : many entrepreneurs complain about the complexity of the tax code and requirements of other regulatory and inspect ion bodies. According to them, the tax police makes no dist inct ion between genuine, skilled tax-evaders and inexperienced small-business people, who often do not fully understand all the bookkeeping requirements. During tax disputes, companies often have little recourse other than the courts to solve their problems. However, while firms have successfully appealed to the courts, tax authorit ies are often slow to implement judicial decisions. This behaviour can be harmful in some case since penalt ies for non-compliance include confiscat ion of property and freezing a company's bank accounts.
After the 1990's, Government regained control over the oil and gas sector. Now, the state companies Rosneft (oil) and Gazprom (gas) play a key role in this sector, that falls upon the 2008 "Law on strategic industries" already ment ioned. Recent struggles on Product ion Sharing Agreements (PSA), that were designed in the 1990's to attract foreign investors, have raised concerns about the safety of the investments realized by foreign companies. Under official pressure, one PSA, « Sakhalin 2 », sold its majority stake to Gazprom. As a result, « Kharyaga » and 
The role of judiciary in the Russian business climate
« The investment climate in our country is directly dependent on the judicial system efficiency. Every time I meet with Russian entrepreneurs or foreign investors, they always say the same thing: if Russia is to have a first-class investment climate, the judicial system has to develop, mature and be able to effectively discharge its responsibilities. » Medvedev , February 2010. According to PriceWaterhouseCoopers, the litigat ion process of a commercial tax or dispute in 14 The Hermitage lawyer Sergey Magintsky, who had been fighting corruption of top official in Russia, died in custody in Moscow on 16 November 2009, after 11 months of detention without trial. three instances takes from 9 to 12 months (PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2009) . The « Arbitrazh Court » system is competent on commercial disputes between business ent it ies. A survey conducted for the Inst itute of Contemporary Development concluded that the main problem for the judicial system in Russia is not corrupt ion, but the high level of dependence of judges on government officials. The research showed that cases which do not concern the interests of government bodies are decided object ively. But for sensitive cases, that may result in the condemn of an official, judges tend to protect the interests of the latter. This tendency is explained by the over-dependency of judges' careers and personal situat ions over the chairman of the court, who is nominated by the President of the Russian Federat ion. As Bill Bowring puts it, « This does not mean that every judicial decision is dictated by someone or other. It means that any decision in any case may be dictated » (Bowring, 2010) . As a result, many western enterprises who have investment or trade disputes in Russia prefer to refer to internat ional arbitrat ion in Stockholm or to courts abroad.
Dmitry
Aggregating perceptions : a survey of surveys
Many surveys have been conducted to give an aggregate picture of the business climate and its percept ions by economic agents. Most of them offers comparat ive scores and figures, ranking countries by their respect ive merits according to the given criterion. Of course, these surveys suffer from limitat ions. They are dependent on the select ion of a rather arbitrary list of criteria ; some of them are constructed on « soft data » : they depend also on the number, characterist ics and personal judgements of the persons (almost exclusively businessmen) surveyed. However, thanks to their simplicity, their results are widespread and exert a real influence on business and polit ical decisions. Hence, it is worthwhile to compare the results of these surveys concerning Russia in this sect ion.
The World Bank « Doing Business » publicat ion is one of them. This survey measures the extent of administrat ive control over such economic act ivities as start ing -and closing -a business, applying for a construction permit, hiring employees, registering enterprises' property, gett ing credit, protect ing minority shareholders against ill-conceived decisions of the management, procedures for paying taxes and export ing, enforcing contracts. As shown in Figure 2 , the comparison between Russia and 182 other countries included in the 2009 survey gives an average Journal of Euromarketing, Vol.19, N°2-3, 2010 performance not far from the mean, while underlining two domains in which the administrat ive burden seems to be part icularly heavy : construct ion permits (see sect ion 2.4) and internat ional trade.
[ Fig. 2 To be inserted here]
As shown in Table 2 , a comparison with other BRIMC countries places Russia in a median posit ion.
The Russian situat ion has not evolved much in the last two years : its relat ive position improved according to 5 criteria, although 4 criteria show a degradat ion. The downgrading of its ranking according to the credit criteria may be due to the financial crisis that hit severly the Russian banking system. In addition, a similar analysis conducted in ten Russian cit ies 15 showed that Moscow, which is taken as the reference city for comparing Russia with other countries, is one of the most difficult cit ies for doing business in the country (World Bank, 2009b) .
[ Table 2 to be inserted here]
Complet ing the « Doing Business » survey, based on hard data obtained by a direct test ing of the administrat ive operat ions, the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment and Enterprise Survey (BEEPS) propose a yearly coverage of the businessmen opinion on a range of issues about the business environment in Russia and other countries of Central and Eastern Europe, former Soviet Union, as well as Turkey. In Russia the sample is of more than 1000 firms in construct ion, hotels and restaurant, manufacturing, wholesale and retail, transport and other services. It was carried out from September 2008 to March 2009.
[ Table 3 to be inserted here] regulat ions and their enforcement seemed to be more bearable by companies, while business execut ives increasingly complained about difficult access to skilled and educated workers as well 15 Namely : Irkutsk, Kazan, Moscow, Perm, Petrozavodsk, Rostov on Don, St Petersburg, Tomsk, Tver, Voronej. as inadequate infrastructures (See Table 3 ). Between 2005 and 2008 the share of firms that reported paying bribes dwindle by half, although these results ranked Russia higher than the regional averages. About a quarter of senior management's t ime is declared to be spent dealing with public officials or public services in 2008, an increase of 7 percent from the 2005 survey 16 .
The last survey used in this comparison is provided by the Global Compet itiveness Report (GCR) of the World Economic Forum. Comparing the results of the two BEEPS surveys and the annual GCR is interesting since the two panels of businessmen are different 17 : contrary to the « BEEPS managers », who are largely Russian, the managers surveyed by the GCR work mostly in western mult inat ionals. This structural difference helps to explain the -rare -divergences that can be observed in the two series of assessments of the Russian business climate ( Table 3 ). The BEEPS managers tend to have more difficult ies in hiring skilled workers than the GCR ones who are able, in average, to pay them much higher. Conversely, being more internat ionalized, GCR managers might give greater importance to macro-financial indicators than BEEPs ones. In both surveys however, corrupt ion, tax regulat ions, infrastructure and criminality are considered by business people as the most problemat ic characterist ics of the business environment in Russia.
[ Figure 3 to be inserted here] The « Global Compet itiveness Report » elaborates 12 indicators as a basis for a comparat ive survey measuring the compet it iveness of nat ional economies. These indicators are built through quest ionnaires posted to top business execut ives and experts all around the world. The results of the quest ionnaires are compiled in order to rank economies along the « Global Compet it ive Index », an aggregated measure of the performance of a given country along this twelve dimensions. Figure 3 offers and the goods markets efficiency.
During the last two years, Russian lost twelve places in the GCI ranking (63 th from 51 st in 2008-2009, among 133 countries), mainly reflect ing its economic vulnerability during the crisis. As regard investment climate, the main drawbacks concern the perceived lack of government efficiency (110 th ), little judicial independence in met ing out just ice (116 th ), a lack of property rights (119 th ), concerns about government's favouritism in its dealings with the private sector, and poor corporate ethics (110 th ) in the private sector (World Economic Forum, 2009 ).
Reality in figures : from assessing to investing
It can be noted that despite the overall mediocre assessment of the Russian business environment by firms' decision makers, in 2007 Russia was the fourth most attract ive destinat ion for FDI after China, India and the United States (UNCTAD, 2007) . This ranking was somewhat confirmed in subsequent years, Russia losing only one place, due to its weaker resilience to the crisis 18 .
[ Figure 4 to be inserted here] Figure 4 describes the assessment of locat ion factors that induce -or discourage -investors to take a stake in Russia. Clearly, market size and growth, the presence of compet itors and, to some extent, access to cheap labour and natural resources are the main declared factors of the investor's presence in Russia : they are more often cited than in OECD or other BRIC countries.
Following their assessments by concrete decisions,mult inat ional firms did not hesitate to invest 18 Top six destinations for FDI in 2009 -2011 (percent of the responses to WIPS survey) : 1. China, 56 % 2. United States, 47 % 3. India, 34 % 4. Brazil, 25 % 5. Russian Federation, 21 % 6. United Kingdom 18% (UNCTAD, 2009b .
[ Table 4 to be inserted here]
The period of surge of FDI in the world came to an end in 2008. The total amount decreased by 15 %. Interest ingly, despite this unfavourable background, BRIC economies did not experience a decline in inwards FDI in 2008 19 . In Russia, FDI inflows were driven mainly by large investments in the power generat ion industry 20 then being liberalized (see sect ion 2.4), as well as in the automot ive 21 , beverages 22 and real estate industries. The bulk of FDI in the country has been constantly concentrated in natural resource-related sectors (extract ion, as well as oil and gas refining), reflect ing one of the structural tendency in investment, both foreign and domest ic (see Table 5 and annex for more details about the structure of FDI inflows in Russia). [ Table 5 to be inserted here] 19 UNCTAD Investment Brief, 2009, n°1 20 Fortum (Finland) acquired a controlling stake in TGC-10, RWE (Germany) bought a majority share in and EDF (France) 
21
Renault (France) increased its equity share from 25% to 50%-plus-one in OAO Avtovaz for $1.2 billion (UNCTAD, 2009a) 22 PepsiCo (United States) purchased a 75% stake in Lebedyansky, the country's largest juice producer, for $1.4 billion. This was the biggest deal in juice production in the Russian Federation so far, and the largest foreign acquisition by PepsiCo worldwide (UNCTAD, 2009a) .
Concluding Remarks
Investment climate is a mult idimensional complex that cannot be correctly grasped without due regard to links and differences between theories adopted by the execut ive power, polit ical announcements, legislative acts, enforcement processes, and rules incorporat ion by economic agents.
Our main findings are the following ones :
at the « theories » and « legal » stages of the inst itut ional evolut ion process, repeated declarat ions of top officials have given the image of a country eager to become fully integrated into the world economy. Russian authorities have asserted their will to clarify the legal system regulat ing natural monopolies, to struggle against corrupt ion ant to support of SME and entrepreneurship. Several laws have been adopted in this aim (sect ion 2).
The main problems lie at the "enforcement stage" : it appears that legal texts designed to produce a level playing field in Russia are not fully enforced, while some of them are st ill lacking consistency. Several operat ions conducted recently by the administrat ion in the energy sector have been at odds with official declarat ions about the necessity to protect property rights. In addition, it its current state the judicial system is not in capacity to give full effect iveness to the legal framework in Russia (sect ions 3.1 to 3.3. ).
Consequently, problems arise in the « evaluat ion » stage : in spite of official declarat ions, Russian cit izens and businessmen surveyed continue to consider that problems affect ing the inst itut ional environment are not sat isfactorily tackled by the Russian authorit ies.
Internat ional assessments of the investment climate rank Russia among the least developed countries in the world, far behind other « BRIC » economies (sect ion 3.4).
Paradoxically, we cannot conclude from what precedes that Russia is not an attract ive country for foreign investors : recent FDI figures show a sharp decline since 2007, but the Russian evolut ion is in line with the world dynamics regarding internat ional investment. It can be assumed that this decline is partly due to the reversal of risk appet ite and the global tightening of financing condit ions that occurred after the financial crisis, and not to country-specific factors (sect ion 4).
The inst itut ional approach used in this paper helps to understand the interact ions between all dimensions of the investment climate. It provides an assessment of the Russian business climate evolut ion during the past two years. Also, it can be used to derive public policy implicat ions from our findings :
At the theory stage, authorities should adopt straightforward and non self-contradictory policies regarding foreign enterprises. This move could also facilitate WTO accession of
Russia.
At the legal stage, it remains necessary to overcome the lack of independence of the judiciary system vis-à-vis political power: any sound investment climate requires respect of the state of law. Certain contradict ions regarding the legal treatment of foreign firms should also be removed.
The results of the enforcement stage depend on the former. Assuming that main problems at these stages would have been correctly addressed, Russian authorities should ensure that administrat ive or judiciary bodies are properly prepared for their tasks, namely, interpret ing and giving force to legal texts.
The main shortcoming of this study is the lack of a complete analysis regarding sub-nat ional business climates in Russia. As we have shown in sect ion 3.2, local administrat ions can greatly influence the business environment in their region, given their role in the enforcement process.
The same applies with sectoral analysis : in a fast-transforming country, inst itut ional problems can vary from an industry to another, as the negotiations for WTO accession have been showing extensively for 17 years.
Consequently, one would have to go further in analysing the variables evoked above in order to get a more complete picture of the investment climate in Russia. But this would exceed the scope of this paper. The same remarks can be made about the important question of the economic consequences of the barriers to entry maintained by the Russian authorit ies on some sectors and in some regions. Hence, these topics appear to be an appealing field for future researches on business climate in Russia. 
Annex (Source : UNCTAD, 2009a)
Figure 1. The conceptual framework : dimensions of the institutional change
Source : adapted from Vercueil, 2002. Source : author's calculations based on UNCTAD, 2009b. Source : The World Bank, «Russian Economic Report », n°21, March 2010 (note : The most severe problem ranks number 1, the least 14) and World Economic Forum, « Global Competitiveness Report 2009 
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